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LIST OF ACRONYMS
The presence and participation of children in war, as casualties and soldiers,
is not a new phenomenon. Between 1998 and 2001 children were being
used as soldiers in at least 87 out of 178 countries – including both conflict
and non-conflict situations1. In Uganda, forced conscription of children into
conflict as soldiers and combatants first gained prominence during 1980,
when Museveni’s resistance force had recruited an estimated 3,000 kadogos.
Uganda was chosen as a case study because of the continued abduction of
children by rebel forces and the ongoing prevalence of violence against 
ordinary people, resulting in an increasing incidence of refugees and mass
internal forced displacements. The presence of Ugandan Government 
military forces in Sudan is an added dimension to the regionalisation of the
conflict.
In the mid- to late 80s, two successive armed opposition movements picked
up the remains of decommissioned Acholi fighters from Musseveni’s resist-
ance movement. Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement was succeeded by a
breakaway-armed group led by Joseph Kony, which emerged as the focus of
military opposition to the government in the Gulu District. Like Lakwena,
Kony claimed to be possessed by religious forces, which used him as a medi-
um. In this manner he was able to create a charismo-ideological notion that
gathered support and momentum. The name of the movement was changed
to the United Christian Democratic Army (UCDA). This army was responsible
for several thousand child abductions to bolster its ranks, as well as serious
human rights abuses against civilians in Northern Uganda.
Although estimates vary, most would suggest that by the end of 2000, over
15,500 children have been abducted since the beginning of the war. Less than
6,000 of these children had managed to escape or have been liberated from
captivity.2
According to the testimonies of escapees, extreme violence was used as a tool
to coerce civilians into providing support and as punishment for not obeying
the laws set down by the LRA. Newly abducted persons were terrorised by
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LRA commanders to ensure that they stayed with their captors. Moreover,
senior LRA combatants systematically used sexual degradation as a form of
control and authority. The UN Secretary General reported that at least 85% of
girls who arrived at the Gulu trauma centre for former LRA abductees had
contracted sexually transmitted diseases during their captivity.3
Psychosocial rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for youth who have
escaped or were released from the LRA have been established since 1994 and
are reasonably well integrated locally, both with communities and as part of
the Government’s overall demobilisation and amnesty programme. While
some former abductees return directly to communities, the majority pass
through one of several non-governmental rehabilitation and reintegration
programmes.
In spite of the culture of peace and discourses of forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion within recipient communities, there are real tensions around reintegra-
tion and reconciliation surrounding the return of ex-abductees. Experiences
within the LRA may have fundamentally altered the manner in which ex-
abductees function as members within a family or as constituents within a
community. Community members have concerns that this may be negative,
and that ex-abductees may be aggressive or violent as a result of the violence
they themselves were exposed to. Teachers and community leaders noted
another side to this story. Some of the children who returned were stronger
and more confident than children who were never abducted and their expe-
riences in the bush coupled with the success of escaping gave them a new-
found confidence from which leadership qualities have grown.
Reintegration occurs in the context of family relationships that are conducted
under a state of uncertainty and emergency. Few social services and infra-
structure, no matter how rudimentary these may be, could be considered as
functional. Schools have ceased to function in many areas, water supplies are
constantly disrupted and transport networks are contingent on the security
situation and thus unreliable. The economies have been shattered and link-
ages to the greater region highly disrupted, if not completely severed.
Subsistence agriculture has come under pressure as people have been
squeezed into ever decreasing geographical spaces as a result of voluntary or
forced relocation to IDP camps or into towns. Where remnants of ‘normality’
exist, they operate under conditions of extreme stress. This monograph high-
lights the process of reintegration of LRA abductees in this context: it may
hold the seeds of future conflict or contribute to future peace.
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The reception was so good for me because they had no hope that I
was alive. They welcomed me but it seemed they had some fears I
had done atrocities so they kept asking all these questions. I was not
forced to kill anybody so I told them everything that had happened…I
didn’t like it because they wanted to know in detail all that had hap-
pened and I was not free about it. It made me sad.4
According to United Nations’ estimates, a quarter of a million children under
the age of 18 years serve as soldiers in national and guerrilla armies in conflict
across the globe. In the past ten years, more than two million children have
been killed in armed conflicts and almost three times as many – some six 
million children – have been seriously injured or permanently disabled. These
conflicts have challenged comfortable, Western assumptions about war and
about children: that war, while not always desired, is sometimes “necessary”;
that war is fought between trained, adult soldiers; that casualties of war are
primarily soldiers, not civilians; that there are clearly defined aggressive and
aggrieved parties; and that children are innocents in need of benevolent state
protection during war. The presence and participation of children in war and
conflict, as casualties and soldiers, is not a new phenomenon. However, dur-
ing the last few decades, a shift has occurred from using children and adoles-
cents, not only as adjuncts to or the last line of defence in conflict, but also as
‘principal’ participants in many of the globe’s wars. Between 1998 and 2001
children were being used as soldiers in at least 87 out of 178 countries –
including both conflict and non-conflict situations.5
The increase in the use of child and adolescent soldiers is directly related to
changes in the value chain of weapons technologies, or, in other words, the
proliferation of small arms. There are two points that need to be made here.
The first is a design and development issue. For much of the 20th century,
weaponry was either too expensive and/or too heavy for children to handle.
Technological developments, facilitated by sophisticated information and
communications technology-enabled design tools, have provided the means
to manufacture simpler and lighter weapons. The second is a supply issue.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE INVOLVEMENT OF
AFRICAN CHILDREN IN CONFLICT
The post-Cold War era has resulted in the wholesale flooding of redundant,
cheap but efficient weapons in Africa.
A further significant change has been the recruitment and inclusion of girls,
alongside boys, as soldiers. There are confirmed reports of girls under the age
of 18 in government forces, paramilitaries/militias and/or armed opposition
groups in 36 countries between 1990 and 2000.6 The use of girl soldiers is
revealed in an additional 10 countries in the 2001 Coalition to Stop the use
of Child Soldiers Global Report – bringing the total to 49 out of 178 countries
between 1990 and 2001.7 Children under the age of 18 who serve in armed
forces and armed groups around the world are vulnerable to serious physical
and psychological violence. For some child soldiers the dangers faced include
sexual violence.
Child soldiers serve within militaries and armed groups in which complete co-
operation and obedience is demanded, in contexts where moral and legal
safeguards against their abuse may have broken down. In this context sexual
violence becomes sexual exploitation. For young girls, participation, voluntary
or coerced within either formal military or militia structures, holds an ever-
graver picture and has often said to be comparable to sexual slavery. Evidence
suggests that in many of Africa’s wars sexual slavery is imposed on most
abducted girls, with possible exceptions of some pre-pubescent girls.8 In
northern Uganda, for example, the majority of girls and women in rebel
camps have syphilis or other sexually transmitted diseases, against 60% of
boys and men. The vast majority have been infected during their period in
captivity.9 People who work with former child members of the rebel move-
ments verify that female abductees inevitably become victims of rape by those
to whom they are allocated or by senior soldiers.
Worldwide therefore, changes have occurred in the extent and nature of the
participation of children conflict and war and this means the issue of the rein-
tegration of children and youth that have been distanced or cut-off from their
communities of origin as a result of their participation in military units presents
a challenge for social and political processes in conflict and post-conflict con-
texts.
The war in Northern Uganda
In order to understand the context in which children are being reintegrated,
it is important to explore the dynamics and causes of the present conflict.
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These lie in political disenfranchisement, long term economic under-devel-
opment of the Acholi region, over-representation of Acholi in the military and
the existence of a war economy in which ongoing conflict meets the vested
interests of specific groups.10 To some extent, the present conflict also has its
roots in the failed reintegration of earlier waves of demobilised soldiers.11
Northern Ugandan history has witnessed endless wars and incursions, some of
which are highlighted in the paragraphs to follow. In the 1850s, Arab slave
traders established posts in Acholiland and plundered the resource base of the
local population. Twenty years later, in 1872, the arrival of Nubian troops saw
numerous atrocities committed against the Acholi, and Nubian troops were
again used by the British colonial administration as a means of asserting
power.
Soldiering or involvement in military activity has played a significant part in
the social and economic life of the Acholi region over the past hundred years.
Under British rule, the Acholi were significantly represented in the military.
Soldiering was a source of prestige, employment and identity for young Acholi
males in the absence of other economic opportunities. Given the complex
military and political history of Uganda, the Acholi found themselves at times
as part of the national armed forces and at others, as fighting as parts of vari-
ous rebel groups against the Government of the day.
Uganda gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1962 under
Milton Obote, whose army was dominated by Acholis. Nearly ten years later,
in 1971, Idi Amin Dada, the military commander of the mainstream army
ousted Obote. Amin in turn was removed in 1979 by a coalition of forces
from Tanzania and Ugandan opposition groups. After a brief transitional peri-
od, Obote was reinstated in 1980, but was once again overthrown five years
later by the military.
Many of Obote’s soldiers during his second regime were Acholi from
Northern Uganda, with a significant proportion drawn from Acholiland.12
During his time, General Tito Okello did little to change the composition of
the army. However, a few years later, in 1986 Yoweri Museveni, the country’s
current President, removed Okello from power.
President Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM), drawn
primarily from the southwestern region of the country, started the process of
decommissioning the Acholi. In their pursuit of ousting the last vestiges of
opposition, they used violence and committed gross human rights violations
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(of mostly Acholi), which ignited the fuel that resulted in a low-level conflict
that simmered for years. Many Acholi members of the previous national army,
the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) fled north when the army dis-
integrated and some regrouped in Sudan, as the Uganda People’s Defence
Army (UPDA).
Alice Lakwena began mobilising small groups of these deserting rebel soldiers,
mostly Acholi and Luo, along with some civilians into the Holy Spirit
Movement (HSM). Lakwena’s movement gained popularity and support
through a powerful combination of political disenfranchisement with local
spiritual ideology and Christian beliefs. During the second half of 1986, the
HSM engaged in numerous attacks on civilians and government forces. A year
later (by the end of 1987), the HSM was defeated.
Following this defeat, a breakaway-armed group led by Joseph Kony, emerged
as the focus of military opposition to the government in the Gulu District. Like
Lakwena, Kony claimed to be possessed by spiritual forces, which used him
as a medium. In this manner he was able to create a charismo-ideological
notion that gathered support and momentum. The name of the movement
was changed to the United Christian Democratic Army (UCDA). This army
was responsible for several thousand child abductions to bolster its ranks, as
well as serious human rights abuses against civilians in Northern Uganda.
The abduction and forced conscription of children into conflict as soldiers and
combatants, however, first gained prominence during 1980, when Museveni’s
resistance force had recruited an estimated 3,000 kadogos (Bugandan for
“child soldier”). All kadogos were under the age of 16 years and approxi-
mately one-sixth were young girls. It is difficult to form an accurate account
of how these children were treated, as little documentation and few verbal
accounts exist. Studies undertaken after the NRM came into power however,
suggest that beyond insufficient training and exposure to risk, most children
were treated the same as the adult soldiers.13
The history of conflict in Uganda has been tainted with brutality that extends
into the heart of civil society. The initial NRM counter offensive in Gulu
District reaffirms this. Government soldiers confused the Acholi for the UCDA
and were responsible for a number of extra-judicial executions. Furthermore,
in order to limit the UCDA’s access to Acholi resources, thousands of people
were relocated to internal displacement camps and their homes and grana-
ries destroyed. The local economy – based on agricultural commodities like
cocoa, vanilla and coffee – collapsed when farmers were forced to abandon
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their land and take refuge elsewhere. Despite these ‘military efforts’ the
UCDA forces were not defeated and by 1991, in yet another major military
offensive, the north of the country was virtually sealed of from the rest of
Uganda.
During the same time, the UCDA continued to plunder the local populace,
abducting their children and utilising their resources. Some of the laws passed
on local civilians in the countryside included: a ban on riding bicycles (per-
sons on bicycles could quickly reach army detaches); habitation near roads
(where people may witness landmines being planted or ambushes being laid);
and keeping pigs (which appeared to be a response to support from the
Islamic Sudanese Government). Punishment for breaking these laws was
death. Despite these measures the campaign failed. As such, in 1992, a more
politically orientated counter-insurgency strategy that sought the co-operation
of Acholi civilian authorities was initiated.
By early 1994 a political solution was sought with Kony and his forces, now
known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Before any progress could be made,
the Sudanese Government – in response to Ugandan support for the mainly
Christian Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels in the south of that
country – formally offered the LRA military and logistical support. This resulted
in an increase in the scale of violence and child abductions. To compound mat-
ters, since mid-1996 nearly half the population of Gulu District – approximate-
ly 200,000 people, who normally resided in communities of scattered farms –
have been forced to flee their homes. They sought sanctuary in Gulu Town, or
other outlying trading centres, small army posts (known as detaches) in so-called
protected villages and Internal Displacement Camps (IDCs).
Conflict in Uganda continued until 1999, when for no given reason, the LRA
almost completely ceased their activities. Relative calm returned to the area
and many civilians were allowed to return to their villages. The LRA resumed
operations in 2000, when violent acts against civilians and child abductions
escalated once more. Although estimates vary, most would suggest that by the
end of that year, in total since the beginning of the conflict over 15,500 chil-
dren had been abducted since the beginning of the war. Less than 6,000 of
these children had managed to escape or had been liberated from captivity.14
According to the testimonies of escapees, extreme violence was used as a tool
to terrorise civilians into providing support, or for not obeying the laws put
down by the LRA. Newly abducted persons were terrorised by LRA com-
manders to ensure that they stayed with their captors. Moreover, senior LRA
combatants systematically used sexual degradation as a form of control and
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authority. The UN Secretary General reported that at least 85% of girls who
arrived at the Gulu trauma centre for former LRA abductees had contracted
sexually transmitted diseases during their captivity.15
During 2001, the Canadian Government launched the first serious initiative
aimed at securing the release of abducted children. This initiative came as a
direct result of the September 2000 International Conference on War-
Affected Children held in Winnipeg. Delegates released a 14-point plan to
end the suffering of children caught in war zones and launched an optional
protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child calling
for nations to raise the minimum age of military service.16 Lloyd Axworthy, the
(former) Canadian Foreign Minister, brokered a deal between Uganda and
Sudan, aimed at putting aside differences and encouraging the LRA to release
the abducted Ugandan children still in held in their camps. Negotiations were
extended to include the disarming of the LRA and the relocation of their
camps to distances of one thousand kilometres outside of the Ugandan bor-
der. In return, Uganda was required to stop support for the Sudanese People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA based in southern Sudan is itself engaged
in a war of liberation, in the hope of disengaging the southern and pre-dom-
inantly Christian part of the country, from the predominantly Muslim north.
Although a protocol was signed, which allowed access for the friendly
Ugandan forces to execute limited military operation within the borders of
Sudan in order to deal with the LRA problems, in reality, very little happened
following the conclusion of these negotiations. By 2001, the LRA had cur-
tailed their operations and relative calm returned to the region. The Ugandan
government also began to relax its restrictions on the civilian population and
some villagers were either allowed to return to their homes or to extend their
farming activities in areas around the IDCs. However, following both the
desire to exploit mineral resources in southern Sudan and in the wake of the
‘September 11’ terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington in 2001,
Museveni successfully lobbied the United States to have the LRA officially
labelled a terrorist organisation. The impact of the Sudanese government’s
cutback of aid to the LRA was to weaken the rebel group, but did not lead to
its disintegration. In response to this, in late 2001, the LRA began moving from
its bases south of Juba to Upper Talanga, a remote area of the Imatong
Mountains on the Sudan/Uganda border. During this time the LRA also
attacked and looted southern Sudanese villages for food.
In March 2002, impatient with diplomatic efforts to end the war in the north,
Uganda launched a massive military offensive to ensnare the LRA. With 
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limited support by Sudanese government forces, “Operation Iron Fist” was ini-
tiated. The initial targets for elimination were four LRA base camps on the
eastern bank of the White Nile in southern Sudan. The UPDF committed a
full division of 10,000 soldiers to an offensive into southern Sudan. Frequent
clashes with the rebels saw several hundred LRA combatants being killed.17 It
was estimated that there were no more than 2,000 LRA combatants in
Sudan.18
In addition to eliminating the LRA as a ‘terrorist’ force, another objective was
to facilitate the release of captured children. However, after the first seven
months, the military effort failed to rescue any of the abducted adults, youth
or children. While the LRA released 100 captive women and children in mid-
June, no further individuals were released or liberated by the Ugandan mili-
tary. In effect, the LRA displaced from their bases in southern Sudan scattered
into smaller bands and fled into mountainous terrain, leaving violence and
destruction in their wake.
Relocating in northern Uganda they sparked a ferocious counter-attack that
led to hundreds of casualties and forced thousands more civilians to flee their
homes, adding to the already large number of displaced. One report suggest-
ed, that as of September 2002, an estimated 552,000 Ugandans were dis-
placed or at risk of having no harvest.19 In addition to which, at least 24,000
Sudanese refugees were seeking refuge in northern Uganda having been
forcibly displaced from southern Sudan by Ugandan forces. UNICEF estimat-
ed that, at the end of June 2002 a total of 5,106 children remain unaccount-
ed for.20 These figures, however, could not be verified, because United
Nations agencies, international relief organisations and independent media
were denied access to the area to monitor the situation.
It is also worth noting that the LRA is not the only armed group operating in
the north of the country. In the northwest of the country, the Western Nile
Bank Front (WNBF), which is also reported to use children as soldiers, is allied
with the LRA and was also supported by the Sudanese government. The
WNBF has launched incursions from bases in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). In the northeast of Uganda, armed members of the
Karamojong, a marginalized minority group, have also reportedly abducted
children for similar reasons. Armed gangs of Karamojong rustle cattle and
ambush and raid vehicles. This is said to happen over a geographic area
extending across the borders into Kenya and Sudan and on numerous occa-
sions provoking serious incidents with neighbouring countries. Other armed
opposition groups include the Ugandan National Rescue Front, which 
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operates in the northwest and the Tabliqs, a Muslim group with an estimated
strength of about 400 men.21 It is not known whether these groups recruit or
use under-18s as soldiers.22
The Current Impasse in Northern Uganda
At the time of writing, there were no signs of LRA-abducted children emerg-
ing, even as prisoners of war, with Ugandan troops. The war with the LRA
would appear to have reached a new stage and the UPDF has admitted that
during military combat, its forces were unable to protect civilians in southern
Sudan. It also admitted that children were being killed rather than rescued.23
In response to international criticism, instead of committing to minimising
child casualties, a UPDF spokesman emphasised that the children had been
militarised, indoctrinated and trained to resist. Such statements served to legit-
imise in the spheres of the general public and other governments, the mas-
sacre of the captive children by Museveni’s armed forces and government.
Undoubtedly, many of the abducted children have been forced to participate
in atrocities and military combat and are thus ‘legitimately’ considered soldiers
or even terrorists. As such they are viewed as justifiable military targets – forced
to fight and are attacked for fighting. However, some of these children have
embraced the doctrines of the LRA, because they believe that this is the only
way to maintain their way of life, or even to survive.
Chris Dolan, who spent more than two years as a researcher in the war-ravaged
north of Uganda for the London-based Agency for Co-operation and Research
in Development, has questioned the accuracy of estimates on the numbers of
“child soldiers” recruited by the LRA. Commenting on the fact that not a single
child-soldier had been released, he said, “If there were 10,000 children, I can’t
believe 10,000 soldiers couldn’t catch some of them.”24 Countering the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) April news web site, which stated that some
5,550 children were still missing, he claimed that the number of children work-
ing for the rebels was unlikely to exceed 900. Furthermore, he argued that focus
on the rebels’ recruitment of children diverted attention away from reports of
the UPDF’s own use of child soldiers since 1998 in conflict in the neighbouring
Democratic Republic of Congo.
It has also shifted attention away from the conditions of more than 500,000
people defined as “in need” in Uganda’s northern area. These individuals
were uprooted from their homes and were heavily dependent on food aid
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supplies from the United States. Dolan suggests that the emotional impact of
abducted children creates an enormous capacity for generating funds.
Although not minimising the notion that child abductions for military or other
purposes are both deplorable and traumatic, Dolan argues that the heavy
emphasis on this single factor has done little to help resolve the country’s 15-
year long conflict and has diverted attention from the extreme needs of tens
of thousands of children and adults.
Notwithstanding current developments, LRA leaders have on a number of
occasions sent word through religious leaders in the north that they wish to
discuss a peaceful end to the conflict. The Ugandan Government has indicat-
ed a desire to listen to the most recent of these, but has refused to suspend
military operations while talks take place. However, if previous attempts to
resolve the conflict are to be considered, the prospects are very dim indeed.
The war has continued and although peace talks have been mooted, the
impasse continues.
The most recent efforts were initiated during the last week of October 2002,
when Museveni appointed the highest level delegation ever convened by the
Ugandan government under the aegis of the First Deputy Prime minister and
minister of Internal affairs, Eriya Kategaya, to head the Government’s negoti-
ating team. The Archbishop of Gulu, John Baptist Odam, who is the chairman
of religious leaders and elders peace initiative, said (on October 23th), that
Museveni wrote to him, saying the government had initiated an indirect dia-
logue with Kony and were exchanging letters. According to Odam, “after
naming their team, the LRA and the government will then agree on the venue,
time and agenda of the meeting.” He said he was waiting for further devel-
opments before trying to send emissaries to talk to the LRA leadership. The
following week however, the Ugandan government claimed that Kony had
only narrowly escaped capture.25
The LRA and the Acholi community: the position of abductees
Contexts of conflict are often discussed as if there are clear and identifiable
groups with no ambiguity or contradiction. In Northern Uganda, the war is
generally portrayed as a conflict between the opposing forces of the LRA, the
UPDF and more recently the SPLA as the conflict has, over time, become
embroiled in Sudanese politics. The civilian population is portrayed as pas-
sive and as a resource base that is terrorised and plundered. The terms ‘rebel’
or ‘soldier’, and ‘civilian’ are used dichotomously as a person is constructed
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as either one or the other. The relationship between the warring factions and
civil society then seems clearly demarcated. However, in a conflict like that in
Northern Uganda, where perhaps as many as 90% of the ‘rebels’ are abduct-
ed children and youth of local communities, the relationship between the
rebel group and civil society has to be much more complex than traditional
language allows to be conveyed. As a child or youth is abducted and becomes
part of the adui (rebels), he or she remains a son or daughter, brother or sis-
ter, niece or nephew to adults in the community. This has clear, but complex
implications for reintegration.
At the core of most conflicts lies either an ideological discourse between com-
peting forces, or a desire to impose hegemonic control of one of the forces over
the other, in order to control either a spatial entity or limited resources. Neither
the precursor of the LRA, Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement nor Kony’s Lord’s
Resistance Army have presented political programmes that are readily compre-
hensible to western lay analysis, beyond the call for Uganda to be ruled accord-
ing to the biblical Ten Commandments. While political marginalisation and long
term economic underdevelopment of the Acholi region may be root causes of
the present conflict, the LRA has not expressed a coherent political agenda in
those terms. Many rebel groups have the tacit support of the communities out
of which they operate; this is not the case with the LRA.26 The rebels are not
representatives of the people, nor do they attempt to articulate an agenda that
could be construed as such. In addition, the LRA would seem neither to have
the attitude nor structure of an effective military unit, but rather their combat
effectiveness is largely symbolic and reliant upon evocation of fear, in both their
abducted ‘soldiers’ and in the Acholi community in general.
In conflicts that take the form of civil war, there is an internal/external dynam-
ic with respect to who the ‘enemy’ is. The conflict between Lakwena’s Holy
Spirit Movement and the Ugandan Government forces initially had this struc-
ture. However, with the failure of Lakwena’s movement to overthrow the
Government, and the HSM’s defeat and dissolution, Kony’s LRA emerged in
a political vacuum. While the LRA’s stated enemy is the Government and is
integral to Kony’s account of why they are rebels, the present conflict does
not have the dynamics typical of a civil war. It is more accurate to say that, as
the LRA are almost entirely organised around the magnetism of Kony, it takes
on the structure of a warlord and his militia. The relationship of the LRA with
the Acholi community is therefore more accurately viewed through that lens.
In defining “warlodism”, Mackinlay notes that warlords are a wholly negative
phenomenon and should not be confused with insurgents fighting an ideo-
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logical or political war.27 The former deals with the local population in a rap-
ine and predatory manner, while the latter has to use the population as its
resource, often with civil society’s tacit support. Insurgents may use some of
the trading techniques of warlords, but if they really are insurgents with a long
term political agenda, they will eventually return to a political end game, for
at some stage they will either have to opt for co-existence or submit them-
selves to the electorate. The LRA are not insurgents and by labelling them a
terrorist organisation, the Ugandan government has legitimised their existence
when, arguably, there is no legitimacy at all.
Returning to the question raised above, how can we understand the relation
of the LRA to Acholi civil society? In most cases, the conflict is referred to as a
‘war’, the targets of the LRA being both Government forces of the UPDF and
the Acholi communities that it terrorises. However, the LRA is not at war with
the community, but utilises the community as a resource base for both food
and human capital – and uses terror as a mechanism to wield control and
power. From the outset, Kony has acted as a warlord, plundering local
resources and perpetrating human rights abuses. The web upon which the
various relationships are spun is more complex than what is currently por-
trayed. Certainly, some accounts of the present attacks by the LRA on Acholi
civil society relate that Kony is ‘punishing’ the people for withdrawing their
support and the fighters feel isolated and abandoned. Kony’s dedicated band
of followers reject and ignore internationally accepted rules of conduct gov-
erning the relationship of the officer to the soldier: treatment of the wound-
ed; custody of prisoners and the protection of non-combatants. At the core of
their impunity lies the use and abuse of children as slaves, either for soldier-
ing, transporting or sexual gratification. This is yet another characteristic of
warlordism. Therefore there is a complex identity between the Acholi civil
society and the LRA, which is assumed to be mainly composed of abducted
children and youth of its communities. These dynamics are arguably central
to the issue of reintegration.
Methodology
Fieldwork was carried out over a two-month period in June-July, 2002.
Narrative interviews were undertaken with ten formerly abducted youth,
seven males and three females, who were invited to participate in the
research by staff of GUSCO or World Vision centres. These were youth that
had previously gone through their programmes and were now living back in
the community for a period of two years or more. The objective of the
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research, namely to understand the lives of formerly abducted children after
they had been reintegrated into their respective communities, was explained
to each participant. Participants were encouraged to ask questions of the
researchers. In nearly all cases, their questions related to what would the
research be used for. We explained it was commissioned by the AU and was
to be part of a report for African governments on youth, conflict and reinte-
gration. Only one youth decided not to be part of the study. At the start of
each interview, each participant was told they were to indicate if there was
any question they wished not to answer, or if they wanted to withdraw from
the interview at any point. Interviews were loosely structured around the par-
ticipant’s life before abduction, social structures in the LRA, and experiences
on reception and reintegration. The rest of the interview was governed by an
individual’s story. 
Focus group discussions were carried out with teachers, local authorities and
parents. In identifying parents for focus group discussions, we initially thought
that, for ethical reasons, it would be best to run separate groups for parents of
formerly abducted children who were returned from the bush, and for par-
ents whose children were still in captivity. In practice, the reality was more
complex as many parents have experienced the abduction of more than one
child, one of who may have returned while one or more were still in the bush,
unaccounted for or dead. Key informant interviews were conducted with staff
in Gusco and World Vision reintegration centres, with local authorities, an IDP
camp worker, and a traditional healer.
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There are said to be three primary aspects to rebuilding war-ravaged societies:
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Disarmament entails the col-
lection, storage and disposal of weapons, as well as the demobilisation, formal
registration and release from duty of combatants (including provision of assis-
tance to help them meet immediate needs and transport to their home com-
munities).28 Reintegration, the third step in this process, is defined as ... “the
process of helping former combatants return to civilian life and readjust both
socially and economically.29 Implicit in this definition is the assumption that
that to which former combatants return is a stable, suitable and desirable form
of society. It is worth reflecting upon the usefulness of this definition of rein-
tegration, since it assumes among others, the following:
• That the process, if there is one, is a unified and effective one, able to
achieve the goal of the child’s social an economic “readjustment”
• That “social readjustment” is possible and desirable; and
• That “economic readjustment” is possible.
It does not take into account the possibility that the identity of the returning
individual may have been charged and changed through the violence experi-
enced and through being identified with the group perpetuating violence on
the host community. Reintegration has to involve reciprocal ‘readjustment’ by
both the individual and community. This element of reintegration has gener-
ally been overlooked. In order to further the analysis being developed here,
namely to attempt to understand the complex relationship between child
abductees, the LRA and civil society, which comes together at the point of
reintegration, a process account is outlined examining the implications for
children and their communities from abduction through to reintegration.
CHAPTER 2
CHILD SOLDIERS IN NORTHERN UGANDA:
EXPERIECE AND IDENTITY
The Abduction: violence and trauma
On the walls of a classroom in the World Vision rehabilitation centre in Gulu
is a series of murals, based on the common elements in children’s own draw-
ings that depict the ‘story’ of abducted children. The first picture is of a peace-
ful rural domestic scene, with a mother pounding grain outside the door of
the family tukel (huts) and children playing in the compound. The next image
is the arrival of the rebels in military uniform, terrified figures running in all
directions, squawking chickens, and tukels on fire. The third is of a column of
children and youth, against their will being marched into the bush, carrying
the food stock of their own village on their heads, with heavy, sorrowful faces.
As returned children tell the account of their abduction, there is a striking sim-
ilarity to their stories. This serves both to hide the way each child experienced
their own fears and horrors, as well as to put children’s experiences out in a
public domain where they are accessible to the whole community. This must
give children that have been through such an experience a sense of ‘normal-
ity’ of the abnormal that is common in war affected societies. It also becomes
part of the imagination of the community, while children who have never
been abducted can look at the murals, tell the story depicted and fear such a
fate – which at some point might become theirs.
One 21-year-old youth who was abducted in 1995, when he was 14 told the
following:
On the day I was abducted, it was about 8 am in the morning. I had
gone to the field to cultivate. I was heading home in order to go to
school. I heard a noise from the direction of ___. When I looked, I
saw some men in military uniform. They were coming, as if they were
passing by. They signalled to me, calling me to go to them. I didn’t
know who they were, I never knew they were LRA since they were
dressed in that combat clothes, I thought they were Government sol-
diers, so that is how they abducted me, and forced me to join the
captives.
Another youth spent one year in the LRA before escaping. He recounted his
abduction as follows:
In my family, we were 6 brothers and 6 sisters. I was abducted when
I was 17 years old. It was during nighttime. They came during night-
time when I was asleep with my brothers. They took three of us. Of
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the three, I am the only one that escaped; the other two are still there.
One is 7, one is now 11.
Other youth tell similar stories; of being abducted from school, from cultivat-
ing in the fields, from fetching water. One 22 year old gave the following
account:
It was in 1996. I was still asleep. It was approaching 6 am in the morn-
ing. The rebels of the LRA stormed in and forced me out and forced
me to join the captives. They were about 15 in number.
The details are imprinted in their memories as they recall, “It was a Saturday”,
or the exact hour of the day. The moment of abduction is a marker that 
signals the end of a life they previously knew.
One of the defining features of present day conflicts, in which civilians are the
primary targets of violence, is the impact of such violence on the daily lives
and routine of the community. Children’s accounts demonstrate that there is
neither place nor time of day that is safe. Abductions occur during the day or
at night, in school, in the fields or at home -the familiar places in which daily
life is conducted become infused with fear. There is no predictability to the
abductions. The impact of child abduction on the social and cultural life of
the community is profound, because fear of abduction disrupts normal rou-
tines and the daily transitions of the community.
In an interview with an adolescent returnee and his father in an IDP camp on
the outskirts of Gulu town, the disruption of civil society caused by child
abduction is evident. He gave an account of how he, together with six other
youth from his village, was abducted. His brother had been abducted a year
before him. Other children that had escaped came back and told the family
he had been killed. The youth already knew his brother was dead before he
himself was abducted. They told of the family’s efforts to stay safe, while try-
ing to retain normalcy and their economic independence.
Interviewer: How did your own life change after your brother was
abducted?
Youth: We were too scared to stay in the home after that so we
moved away to the camp.
Interviewer: So you were living in the camp when you were abducted?
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Youth: I was living in the camp, but we still went to the village to
cultivate. So I had gone to the fields to cultivate, and I was
abducted there.
Interviewer: Did other members of the family still go to the fields to cul-
tivate?
Youth: They continued to go after I was abducted, because there
was no other way (to survive). But many times they heard
rumours that these people are around.
Interviewer (to father): At any point, did you decide not to go to cultivate?
Father: The abductions continued so much during those years that
it was difficult to do so, so we stopped going there, and we
had to live by whatever means we could.
Violence has a corrosive impact on community’s strategies to balance safety
with survival, to retain daily routines and traditional agricultural practices.
Attempting to do so is an expression of hope over helplessness. The power of
the threat of child abduction is that it attacks at the heart of families and com-
munities, in the case of this family forcing retreat. For the rebels, abduction a
tool to assert control and punish whole communities.
Child abduction has also affected the power dynamics between children and
others in communities as those in positions of authority over children, such as
teachers, live with a constant awareness that this power balance could be
reversed. In a focus group discussion, teachers discussed the impact of abduc-
tions on their relations with children in the classroom. There is awareness that
if a child feels he or she has been treated badly by a teacher, if that child is
abducted then “(that child) can have revenge on you, even kill you. Teachers
definitely have that fear.” They said they do not beat children as punishment,
but instead give them some work to do, such as sweeping the compound. In
serious cases, they may call the parent to school and abdicate the punishment
to the parents “the parent now gives the kind of punishment that is fitting.”
Teachers also live with the fear that they themselves may be abducted.
I was a primary teacher at __ primary school. I was abducted one the
3 January 1999 from the village during school holidays. It was night-
time and I was sleeping. In my case, it was a bit different (to other
abductions). When I was abducted, some of my school kids identified
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me as a teacher. When they heard of that profession, they couldn’t
leave me behind so I suspect they took me because I was a school-
teacher. Two of my sons were also abducted. One died. One is alive;
he is still with the rebel group. I was 34 years old.
This teacher spent 9 months in captivity. During this time he was not trained
as a soldier, but had to teach the children of the rebels. This was one way the
LRA attempted to recreate some social structures in the camps.
Abduction is a key tool in military strategy. Kony’s soldiers have abducted a
child from almost every extended family in Acholi, and these children are
then used as pawns to prevent their parents and extended family from sup-
porting the government.30 The fear generated by this strategy infiltrates every
element of community life and in spite of efforts at normalisation, the possi-
bility of abduction fills the imagination of the community, even those who
have yet to experience abduction. As the above account clearly demonstrates,
this ultimately results in displacement, fragmented social relations and the
breakdown in agricultural practices and traditional ways of life.
Within the Lord’s Resistance Army: powerlessness, 
contradiction and resistance
This section attempts to explore the meaning of life within the LRA for chil-
dren and youth. It will focus on the social structure they were forced to
become a part of, their understanding of what the LRA represents, the conflict
experienced when forced to fight as soldiers and their survival and escape.
The reports are based on individual interviews with ten formerly abducted
youth in addition to key informants close to the LRA. As such, it does not
claim to be representative beyond these individual accounts, but instead
serves to give some insight into the highly complex world in which children
are forced to negotiate their survival – given that nearly half of abducted chil-
dren have died or been killed. If youth are released or are successful in escap-
ing, ‘reintegration’ begins from these experiences.
One of the characteristics of movements that abduct civilians to use as fight-
ers is deliberate psychological brutalisation. The primary tool is fear against
which individuals are forced to make impossible choices, or face retribution.
Moreover, the isolation experienced by the youth, in the face of such brutal-
isation, forces them to become dependant on their abductors. Such strategies
have been common in Liberia31 and Sierra Leone32 as well as northern
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Uganda.33 One youth recounted his experiences of the first hours of being
abducted:
They tied me with a rope. They asked very difficult questions and
expected me to answer. Who are the rich people here, who are the busi-
ness people? Take me to their homes. I would tell them I don’t know,
there are no rich people around here, and then they would slap me.
Every moment of the first few days were lived in a paralysis of fear as he was
beaten, witnessed ‘them’ killing other people and didn’t know if he himself
would be killed. Another participant recalled how in the first few weeks, “they
gathered villagers and they killed them. The children were also forced to kill”
but distanced himself from these actions by saying “I wasn’t…”, implying they
had escaped killing, but experienced conflict about it. Another youth told
how, following the abduction of six children from his village, they were called
together by the commander and told that some of them were going to be
killed. According to the commander those who were going to be killed were
the younger children, below 12 years, because they were unable to carry
heavy loads. After being subjected to this state of terror, all were caned 15
strokes each, although none were killed. These forms of psychological torture
serve to render the abductees powerless.
The rebel social structure into which the children are socialised is highly mil-
itarised, with battalions and companies, although the camps are modelled on
a village. The basic unit of the LRA ‘family’, consists of a soldier and his wife
or wives, together with abducted children.34 The younger children (below 13
years) are called ‘siblings’. When asked about how abducted children become
assigned to structures in the camp, one explained:
Whenever the LRA are sending soldiers to go abduct children, you
will find they will pick children from different battalions, and
whichever child has been abducted by a rebel soldier, he will keep
that one as a position for his battalion. The child will be within that
battalion.
Commanders are known as ‘teachers’. Child abductees are often used 
for labour similar to the work they would have done in their home village,
such as guarding goats (which have been captured) and taking them to graze.
The only difference would be that they themselves are being guarded. For
respondents this provided a sense of normalisation, which co-exists in this
brutalising environment.
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A former teacher asked whether they (the abductees) had seen young girls
“given” to rebel officers as wives against their will in the same way as they
would normally in the village. In response a participant replied, “Of course, as
far as I’m concerned, I don’t see any difference between wives from here and
wives from the bush, the only difference is lack of certain commodities and
proper homes.” This statement, however, does not address the reality of the
girls, who are forced into sexual slavery linked to reward systems in the power
hierarchy of the LRA35 but rather captures the process by which the abnormal
becomes normal in the course of daily routines. One young woman, who was
‘given’ as a fifth ‘wife’ to a commander, was asked about living conditions. She
maintained that “everything (was) like a normal village”. They had huts to live
in, cook in, and “I used to keep mine very clean every day.” The latter state-
ment she said with some pride. This posed no contradiction for her to the fact
that she felt happy when she heard that her ‘husband’ had been killed in fight-
ing after her escape.
Initiation Into the life of a ‘rebel soldier’
Within a few weeks of abduction, children and youth reported their training
as ‘soldiers’ began. New abductees are known as ‘recruits.’ A participant said
he was trained for one month in how to assemble and use guns, marching,
how to attack, ambush and to fight. One of the girls said a woman rebel taught
her to assemble a gun and it was her duty to carry that soldier’s gun. She told
how:
We were taught how to shoot a gun, to lay ambushes when you go to
attack the army, and how to enter the detach of the army. When you
lay ambushes, and when a motorcar comes, how even to shoot a
motorcar.”
Learning how “to shoot a motorcar” is powerful, even overwhelming knowl-
edge. Despite this powerful knowledge, LRA commanders can in a moment
render ‘recruits’ totally powerless through random acts of violence and
killings. A participant said, “There was a lot of killing of children. Whoever
tries to escape will be killed, for walking ahead, you will be killed, and even
for a minor mistake children will be severely tortured.”
Another participant explained, “Life was really horrible because there was a
lot of fear in my heart because everyday you didn’t know if you would be
killed. Everyday we see them killing other people.”
25Angela Veale and Akri Stavrou
He said that it was during the training that he suffered the most:“They beat us
all the time. Even when you tell them you are sick. They asked us to beat
other children if they have done something wrong. Other children were asked
to beat me.”
In these accounts, there is still the existence of ‘us’, the abducted children and
the ‘they’ of rebel commanders. However, any solidarity children may feel
because they share the same plight or are from the same village is systemati-
cally and brutally broken down as children are forced into positions of
extreme isolation. All former abductees interviewed felt they could not trust
anyone while in the LRA. The teacher whose two sons were also abducted
indicated that he could not trust his own sons. Mistrust, fear, isolation and the
breakdown of personal allegiances within the group of new ‘recruits,’ are
forcibly created and deliberately manipulated to reduce the distinction
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Simultaneously, the training in military techniques
changes the perceived status of the children within the LRA from ‘recruit’ to
‘soldier’.
Interviews with former abductees gave some insight into how they grappled
with the identity of ‘soldier’ – an experience thrust upon them. One girl said
she was given a uniform and a dress. She was afraid of the uniform, because
it tied her to the identity of a soldier. She felt she would never get out of the
bush and feared being killed in fighting – “I felt I was a soldier and would go
for war”. She was then asked how this made her feel – happy or sad? She
explained, “for the first time, I was so sad and then if you stay for a long time,
you become happy, a bit happy.” In a subsequent discussion it appeared that
because she was a female with no children, she was not perceived as a moth-
er, who could be exempt from fighting, but as a soldier.
Another former abductee spoke about his feelings towards getting a uniform.
He responded as follows:
I didn’t feel well because I didn’t want to be a soldier. Before you are
trained and given a gun, you are treated as a captive, and they are
always beating them. But when I became a soldier and I had a gun in
my hand, at least the level of mistreatment declined.
The military uniform serves as a powerful external symbol that also creates
internal conflict for abductees. This is captured in the way the youth struggled
to express the identity transition they had experienced: “I didn’t want to be a
soldier” is followed by “but when I became a soldier”, and “I felt like a 
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soldier” with “they look at me as a soldier”. Resistance to this identity is con-
veyed through communicating that it is imposed. There are rewards to this
identity transition – beatings and violence become less frequent and having a
gun confers power in contrast to the complete powerlessness of the new
abductee. This is the start of a process in which the new abductees have to
individually negotiate this starting position of ‘them’ and ‘us’, and the com-
plex issue of how, in order to survive, one must pass as ‘them’ while main-
taining a representation of self as ‘not them’. One youth explained, “It’s very
difficult to know if someone wants to come home or not, because no one
talks about that. You have to pretend as if you don’t want to”. It is likely that
for some abductees, their survival strategy is identification with the aggressor,
as they become socialised and integrated in the rebel structure.
Interviewer: Who is a ‘rebel soldier’?
Youth: We were the coreta, the trainees to become full army man.
Interviewer: Do some children eventually become rebels?
Youth: A few become rebels. You become a rebel when you are
already a soldier and you go and …(raid) houses, you
abduct children, you do the killing, you are already a rebel.
The ‘ideology’ of the LRA
One of the most infamous aspects of the HSM, which was the forerunner of the
LRA, is the spiritual or cult-like basis to the movement, mixed with a political aim
of overthrowing the Government. Under Kony, the character of the movement
changed substantially as the level of violence, abductions, punishment and per-
sonal vendettas on Acholi civil society increased. He continued to maintain a spir-
itual base to the movement, with a stated aim of the LRA being to destroy all
forms of evil and promote the Ten Commandments. In the LRA, rituals and com-
munication with spirits are tied in with initiation of new ‘recruits’, preparation for
war, and the ‘cleansing’ of bad spirits or cen after war.
Behrand (1999) gives detailed accounts of the rituals initiated by Alice as part
of the HSM. To a large extent these appropriated traditional Acholi beliefs and
Christian symbolism. She describes examples of ceremonies for new initiates
in which the initiates walked around in a circle, were sprinkled with water,
prayed and sang. “Later they had to spit in the mouth of a pig that absorbed
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all the evil onto itself, just as, in the New Testament, Jesus exorcised the evil
spirits and diverted them into swine. The pig, usually a boar, was then killed
and burned”.36 Initiates were then required to mould human figures of clay,
which represented the cen or spirits of people killed by war. These clay fig-
ures were carried to a spot under a tree while the following prayer was said
“Sir, here before you are your soldiers. Bless them so that all bad things in
them remain under this big tree. Cast out all demons (cen) that may want to
possess them”.37 The clay figures remained under the tree.
Kony claims to be possessed by an angel that speaks through him. Behrand
lists the various spirits of Kony, including a female Sudanese spirit, Silli Silindi,
who served as operations commander; a Korean spirit who controlled the bul-
lets of the NRA; a spirit from the USA, King Bruce, who led the support unit;
and others such as a trickster spirit who switched sides and fought with the
NRA to punish Kony’s soldiers for their transgressions.38 She gives the follow-
ing account of a typical encounter.
All these spirits spoke through Kony, their sole medium. When a spir-
it possessed him, he wore a white kanzu and a rosary round his neck
– like Alice. Kony would sit in the yard on a metal chair holding a glass
of water in his hand. He dipped his finger in the water and made the
sign of the cross. Then he rose slowly, the expression on his face
changed, and his eyes turned red. Then the spirit that had taken 
possession of him began speaking out of him. As under Alice, here too
a chief clerk wrote down whatever the spirit had to say.39
Former abductees who were interviewed spoke about their experience of ini-
tiation rituals. It was difficult to ascertain what meaning, if any, children gave
to these rituals and the impact on their sense of belonging to the LRA. The rit-
uals were not carried out immediately after abduction, but once the group
had arrived to a place of safety.
There is that ritual cleansing. When a child is abducted, he will not be
allowed to eat together with the LRA rebels until that initiation cere-
mony is completed whereby they smear using the shea butter oil; that
is cleansing oil. From time to time they would do it, especially when
a group is being sent for a mission, there would be the smearing of oil
and sprinkling of water.
The ceremony initiated by Alice was a means of cleansing and rehabilitating
ex-soldiers of the impurities and bad spirits that haunted them as a result of
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any violence they may have carried out. It is not clear what role these cleans-
ing ceremonies play in the LRA with respect to the initiation of abducted chil-
dren. Individually, youth had different perspectives on the spirit and ideolog-
ical beliefs of the LRA. One girl, when asked if she believed Kony, responded
We believe everything he says. I saw him once. ___ (a friend) also saw
him. He looks so different. We both thought he had great power. His
face is very strange, strange eyes, so we avoided looking at him
straight. And if he looks at you straight, you get scared.
She firmly believed that Kony was possessed with spirits and thought spirits
also possessed others, but not in the same manner as Kony.
One of the youths, however, felt that Kony’s spiritualism was a form of polit-
ical propaganda.
There was that kind of propaganda where Kony himself would talk to
the children, the captives – that the Acholi are no more, they are not
there, they are already killed. That Joseph Kony would send some
soldiers to wipe out the whole community of Acholi, because they are
not supporting him so he will continue sending his soldiers to kill
them. So for those captives who were there in Sudan, they will give
birth in order to begin another generation of Acholi because those
that are there will all be killed.
He believed this was a way of exerting control on the abductees and to dis-
suade them from attempting to escape. The message received was, “If I go
back (to my village), Kony will send his soldiers to go and kill all (my family
and villagers) …. And that will include me.”
Political ideology can act as a powerful motivational force for youth in the
contexts of conflict and can support psychological resilience and impact upon
post-conflict reintegration.40 The self-reports of former abductees here is con-
sistent with claims that the LRA have no clearly articulated political ideology.
One report notes how the rebel commanders said the recreation of ‘family’
kinship among ‘recruits’ was the only ideological input he had to make.41
However, while the lack of a clearly stated political ideology, combined with
its particular spiritual base, appears to distinguish the LRA from many groups
involved in conflict and make it seem irrational, even schizophrenic, it is pos-
sibly not as unusual as it initially appears. Nordstrom, based on observations
in Mozambique, argues violence is locally constituted, that it is immediate
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and personal and “military process becomes infused with local level culture
and individual motivation- in fact, political ideology and commitment can be
lacking almost entirely among ground troops.”42
An overt political ideology did not emerge in youth’s accounts, while belief in the
spirit base of the LRA was mixed, with some believing in Kony’s spirit possession,
while others cynically viewing it as a propaganda tool for manipulation and con-
trol. It is evident from the interviews with youth that part of the purpose of what
children are being told, is to recast the Acholi community itself as an enemy enti-
ty. Certainly abductees are told that the Acholi are the potential aggressors and
that their communities will likely kill them, should they leave the LRA.
The conflict of being a ‘soldier’ as discussed above also mirrors a conflict with
respect to who is the ‘enemy’. On Sudanese soil, what meaning did it have for
abducted children to be part of the LRA? More complexly, once being part of
an active unit on Ugandan soil, how did the abductee experience the crisis of
being a child of their village, a member of the Acholi community, while simul-
taneously being identified as external to it – as the aggressor, the source of
fear, the rebel soldier of the LRA? As the youth’s narratives unfolded, these
issues emerged and the interviews could then explore the question of who the
‘enemy’ was? It is not possible to give a comprehensive analysis of these com-
plex questions, based on our small sample that escaped from the LRA, but the
discussions offer some reflections on these issues.
The individual accounts of children forcibly recruited as soldiers who later
escaped had a shared theme: their primary task was to survive. Put simply, the
enemy is anyone who threatens your survival. This can be within the LRA or
externally in combat. Unlike many guerrilla movements, the ‘enemy’ is not
defined on ideological grounds as part of achieving a political aim, but prag-
matically in terms of survival.
One young woman, who was in the LRA for 2 years, gave the following
account:
Youth: I fought against the SPLA when we were going for food.
Interviewer: Were you given bullets?
Youth: Yes. If you want to carry 10 magazines, you are free to. [And
you?] Six. It depends on how long the fighting lasts. If it is long,
then you use four or five magazines. In my case, I’d use three.
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Interviewer: How did you feel going back to camp?
Youth: You feel happy, because you take things that can feed you.
Interviewer: Did you know who the SPLA were and what kinds of things
they were doing?
Youth: No. We were just told to go and fight the SPLA.
Interviewer: What kind of things made you sad?
Youth: When you met the UPDF you were sad, because they are our
enemy. When you do not shoot them, they shoot you. You
shoot them in order to survive.
For her, fighting the SPLA did not create conflict in the same way as fighting
the UPDF. An outcome of fighting the SPLA was getting food that could feed
you. The UPDF is Ugandan, as she is Ugandan, and fighting the UPDF is a
source of sadness, because they fought to kill the enemy – but in order to sur-
vive. Another interviewee expressed conflict as follows:
Youth: When fighting against the Ugandan Army, I felt partly as army,
partly as civilian.
Interviewer: You used to steal food from Ugandan families. What did you
feel when you steal food?
Youth: I feel very bad cause the food I am going to steal is my father or
guardian, my brothers or sisters guardian.
Another interviewee highlighted the constant fear of being killed in combat:
“It would be very good if they got food from the villagers but there was also
fear you might be shot dead by people.”
For these youth, this dual role as ‘soldier’/abductee could not be resolved.
One report told how, during an interview with ‘John’, an LRA rebel com-
mander, he justified the looting of food from Acholi communities because he
“had 200 mouths to feed every day” and that some of the food they were tak-
ing from families “was used to feed the families’ own abducted children any-
way.”43 This was one way of rationalizing the fact that violence and looting
caused suffering in one’s own community.
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There were some suggestions from discussions with members of civil society
that some former abductees maintain sporadic contact with their families, and
that the links between a minority of formerly abducted children and their fam-
ily or community of origin is more fluid and more complex than is often recog-
nised in the literature. The youth in our interviews identified their key task as
survival in a world where daily life is permeated by violence, in which the reli-
gious and spiritual beliefs of their home communities had been hijacked as a
form of political propaganda, fear instillation and control and their identity
with home and community had been fundamentally compromised.
Escape From the LRA
Escape offers the only chance for many abductees to leave the LRA. In these
cases, the main opportunities for escape presented themselves once LRA units
were operating within Ugandan territory. While a cross-border reception,
return, rehabilitation and reintegration programme has been established in
Sudan to receive Ugandan children who have escaped, fewer escapees than
expected have been reintegrated through that route. One of our interviewees
explained that “From there (Sudan) if you escape, it is a long way to here, it is
difficult, you will be killed. Escaping from Sudan is very difficult”.
A new development arose just before this fieldwork was conducted. The LRA
voluntarily released 100 individuals, mainly women and young children, with
instructions that they were to be looked after by the community. The ‘release’
of abductees into the custody of the relief agencies had never occurred before.
Possible reasons for this release of personnel were that the LRA were under mil-
itary and political pressure as a result of Operation Iron Fist and the drying up
of support from the Sudanese government. While the reasons behind the
release are unclear, the release, with its message to the community, highlights
again the complex relationship of the LRA viewing themselves as from the com-
munity and having an ultimate responsibility for its members.
We discussed with escaped respondents what escape meant and the details of
their own escapes. Stories of the consequences of trying to escape if caught
were well known. One youth escapee told us the following story:
Youth: My friend was beaten to death, stoned to death, after knowing
he wanted to escape.
Interviewer: How did they find out he was trying to escape?
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Youth: We had been talking – one among us had been talking – go and
tell the secret to the army man; and they called the man. You,
you want to escape, we want you to be an army man, we take
the government but we have no prison to keep you here, the
only thing is dying. You are going to die. And they called four or
five and they stoned that man to death.
Knowledge of the thought of escaping is sufficient to merit the order of a
death warrant. The choices laid out in this story are stark; ‘you want to
escape, we want you to be an army man’. Again there is the dichotomy of
‘you are with us or against us’, which translates in this story into ‘we can let
you live, or we can ensure you die’. In spite of this, the youth in this research,
who were all escapees, continued to keep in mind the idea of escape. For
some, however, the realisation that they were likely to die in the bush,
whether they tried to escape or not, provided the impetus and then motiva-
tion to escape. All reported waiting for the right opportunity, as the following
two accounts illustrate:
An abducted child will continue to persevere through all those kinds
of problems, starvation, torture, sleeping in the rain, each time he will
think of escape but due to the distance, (and) the security you wait
for an opportunity. In my case, we had already crossed over to
Uganda, and they sent us to the observation posts to watch the UPDF
approaching, but we said ‘Since it is raining, can’t you give us a tent’,
but they said no, that would make us almost equal to them, and it was
raining so, so heavily, and it gave us an idea, that was our opportuni-
ty to escape.
Since we were already trained and given guns and then we were sent
back to Uganda for a mission; one say I was shot on the leg and they
took me and kept me until I recovered, and we continued. Another
time, I was again shot. I thought, one day I will be killed in the (bush),
I think it is time for me to escape so while we were in a certain sub-
county there was a UPDF detachment, so bearing in mind the idea of
escape was always in my heart, I thought, the time is now.
The accounts of survival are harrowing and give an indication of the experi-
ences borne by those that have survived to tell them.
Interviewer: How did you escape?
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Girl: Even when we were taken there, they let us even to go and get
food from a Sudanese civilian, and from there we went on
safari (journey), and there was no water, even the grasses are
burnt already and the other is dried totally and we went there,
and we got very many food, goats, peanuts, sorghum, many
things, then when we collected all those things, then on the
way coming back, people were about to die of thirst, even me,
then we walked, walked, then when we were about to reach
the camp, people were totally thirsty, others started drinking
their urine, they would urinate and drink, urinate and drink,
then they ran to those that were in the camp to bring water to
those that were dying of thirst, then we started drinking that
water, then others survived; others died-many people had died,
young children what have you, and the big men also ..
There is also significant fear about how the Acholi communities will receive
those that are out of the LRA, a fear stoked by the LRA itself as a form of control.
I asked about three poor people, civilians, ‘where do I go? If they find
me, will they kill me, what will the reception be like?’. The first per-
son I reported to was the Local Counsellor and he took me to the
army. I was so scared. They said, don’t worry, we won’t harm you and
I began to relax.
Political amnesty and reception
The Ugandan Government established an Amnesty Commission in 2000
based on the Amnesty Bill, which offers immunity from prosecution to those
engaged in fighting the Government since 1986. Initial proposals for a limit-
ed amnesty, which would not apply to those who had engaged in serious
crimes, was not supported by Ugandan communities and a ground-swell of
opinion pushed for a blanket amnesty based on principles of reconciliation.44
The Government acquiesced. The Amnesty Commission was established to
deliver school fees, resettlement packages and Amnesty certificates to those
who left rebel groups and came forward, known as “reporters”.
The procedure for reporting is that the escapee or ‘reporter’ has to report to
the UPDF or the LCs (local counsellors). ‘Reporters’ then had to spend some
time in the UPDF barracks as part of a reception and debriefing process. More
recently, the length of time spent in the barracks has decreased from a few
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months to an average of 5 to 10 days. Most ‘reporters’ spend about a week in
this reception programme. From there, the majority of ‘reporters’ are direct-
ed to one of the three major rehabilitation and reintegration psychosocial pro-
grammes. Some return directly to the community.
To April 2002, the Demobilisation and Resettlement Team of the Amnesty
Commission of Gulu recorded a total of 372 ‘reporters’ in the Acholi region.45
Of these ‘reporters’, 243 were adults, many of whom were likely to have been
children or youth on abduction and the remaining 129 were children. In a
survey of 184 ex-LRA respondents who were part of the amnesty, 43% report-
ed to the LC, 29% to the armed forces (UPDF, SPLA, or Sudanese Armed
Forces), 15% to community leaders, and 15% to NGO’s.46 Only 4% did not
report to any formal structures and returned directly home, indicating that
reception is mainly experienced as formal, with structured referral to non-gov-
ernment rehabilitation programmes being a part of the process, before return-
ing to community settings.
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The first point of reception after their one week debriefing in the UPDF 
barracks for many returnees, is a psychosocial reception centre. Psychosocial
rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for youth escaped or released
from the LRA have been established since 1994, and are reasonably well inte-
grated locally both with communities and as part of the Government’s over-
all demobilisation and amnesty programme. While some former abductees
return directly to communities, the majority pass through one of three non-
government rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Those from Kitgum
province are referred to the Kitgum (KICWA) psychosocial support pro-
gramme. Those from Gulu, Lira and other provinces may be referred to the
Gulu Support the Children Organisation (GUSCO) psychosocial programme
or World Vision War-Affected Children’s Programme, both based in Gulu
town. Presently supported by various international non-governmental and
donor organisations, all have their roots in local initiatives aimed at respond-
ing to the sense of desperation and needs resulting from the effects of con-
flict, abductions and internal displacement. They have grown in size and
stature and their combined influence is now established as part of the support
structures for reintegrated children within protected settlements/displacement
camps and to some extent, in urban and rural communities.
Reintegration: the role of psychosocial interventions
Within Gulu, where the research was conducted, there are two main psy-
chosocial rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for war affected and
formerly abducted children. These are World Vision War-Affected Children’s
Programme and GUSCO, which is an indigenous local organisation formed
mainly by a group of local women who sought to respond to the needs of
abducted children who escaped from the LRA. Both programmes have recep-
tion centres to receive children and youth once they come out of the LRA and
have group and individual counselling programmes, skills training and family
support programmes central to their rehabilitation and reintegration strategies.




programme works intensively with children in centres for a number of months
before supporting their reintegration to communities. Although the GUSCO
programme also uses centres, they move children to communities and iden-
tify themselves as a community-based programme.
It may be useful to give an indication of the psychosocial tasks identified as
integral to rehabilitation and reintegration by outlining in brief, the activities
of the centres. GUSCO, for example, was established in 1994 and has devel-
oped as a community-based programme, with a reception centre to receive
and rehabilitate abducted children and then reintegrate them in communi-
ties. Over time, the programme broadened its mandate to establish an edu-
cation programme for war-affected children in communities. This was
because in their experience, when the programme narrowly focused on for-
mer abductees, reintegration into the community became problematic due
to local envy. The programme has trained community volunteer counsellors
at a parish level, supported by community development assistants at a 
sub-county level. This team works together with a district psychosocial team,
consisting of the heads of Government Departments from Health,
Education, Social Work and Planning. At a national level, there is a nation-
al core team for all agencies working on psychosocial programmes for war
affected children under the Ministry of Gender, including UNICEF, Save the
Children Norway and Denmark, the International Red Cross (IRC) and other
agencies.
The GUSCO compound is located in Gulu town and during the time of our
field visits, the centre had recently received a number of young women with
their children, released by the LRA. This was unusual, for the current group of
ex-abductees fell outside the recent norm. Project staff at the Gulu centres
noted that the profile of abductees and youth received in the centres has
changed over time. In 1997, centres were predominantly receiving 15–18
year olds, but by 1998 and onwards, as the LRA began abducting younger and
younger children, the age profile decreased. Moreover, the recent release of
young mothers with their children has resulted in a new profile of youth to be
reintegrated; those of young female headed family groups.
During one of the visits to the centre, about eight women sat outside their
tented accommodation on mats, playing or nursing their infants or toddlers.
A few of their children were older, about 4 or 5 years old. Of the 63 children
and youth under the care of the programme at the time, 24 were under 6
years. In another part of the compound, a group of youths were in a class-
room engaged in group-work where they had the chance to talk about their
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time in captivity, discuss the things they did and experienced. Four others
helped out in the kitchen, as part of the rehabilitation is communal work and
to have something to do.
An intrinsic part of the rehabilitation programme is the creation of a norma-
tive routine, since waking and sleeping patterns of youth were completely dis-
rupted through frequent moves, forced marching and operations at night. The
project’s primary aim is to facilitate social reintegration, so the stay at the cen-
tre is usually between 4 and 6 weeks. Young women who are pregnant are
not reintegrated until after the birth of their baby. This is because the staff
needs to monitor the attitude of the mother to the child and assess the sup-
port the new mother may need once she has settled in a community. The
project staff is aware of the fact that young women with children may not
want to return home or may not be accepted at home. As such, they focus on
helping the young women, if they so wish, to live independent lives in Gulu
town, while trying to secure their physical and financial security.
When former abductees first arrive at the centre their immediate physical
needs are taken care of. Most return in very poor physical health, suffering
from malnutrition, injuries or stress and trauma related physical illnesses.
Thereafter, individual and group counselling, recreational activities and com-
munal work form part of an integrated programme of rehabilitation. Family
tracing, assessment, preparation and counselling are done at the centre to
prepare families and youth for reunification and reintegration. The need for
tracing is rare for as soon as families hear that new children have arrived, they
come to check for their own children.
Follow-up support is regarded as an important component of the reintegra-
tion work and is provided in communities through community volunteer
counsellors or caregivers. Volunteers receive a bicycle to facilitate their work
but are not paid. Follow-up is usually provided two weeks after their return to
the family and community, then again at three months, six months and a year
later if necessary. For follow-up purposes, a risk assessment procedure is car-
ried out, which categorises youth according to low risk or high risk. Criteria
associated with low risk include having stayed in rebel capacity for a short
period, such as a few weeks, not having been involved in serious atrocities,
lack of serious health problems and having one or both parents still alive.
High-risk criteria include girls who were mothers who have come out with or
without their children and abductees with very serious health problems such
as HIV, or are injured or disabled as a result of conflict.
38 Violence, Reconciliation and Identity
Former abductees are encouraged to return to school and teachers have been
trained to provide psychosocial support within the schools in order to ensure
educational reintegration. Others receive skills training, such as tailoring, bicy-
cle repair, carpentry or joinery. A micro-finance scheme operates for young
mothers, and youth that want to start some micro-enterprise. Advocacy and
information raising is an important component in mobilising communities to
accept youth back and they encourage the promotion and strengthening of
traditional means of conflict resolution.
According to one project staff member, the aim is to promote the message of
peace and reconciliation. Community development is engaged through
“action plans”, which is a new development in the programme. The aim of
the action plans is to bring the community together to define their needs and
problems and mobilise resources to address these. Recent work emanating
from action plans has been the re-generation of some schools and health
units, with international donor support. The evolution of the programme has
been more and more towards incorporating a community development focus
as a way of facilitating understanding, acceptance and reintegration of indi-
vidual abductees. The model of reception centre care, with education or skills
training, family reintegration, community advocacy, community volunteers
and follow-up support are similar in the World Vision programme.
Across various war zones, there has been consistent debate about the role of
centres in the reintegration of war-affected children to communities.47 Some
of the staff in centres in Gulu reflected on this. One argued that some form of
medical screening is crucial before reunifying children with families, and cen-
tres are good for this, particularly for diagnosing STDs that would otherwise go
undetected and untreated, as well as injuries resulting from bullet wounds.
The staff also felt that centres were important in “re-orienting the child’s
mind”, especially re-establishing normative routines, sleeping and waking pat-
terns and dealing with overt aggressiveness. Issues still under review con-
cerned the best manner in which to conduct follow-up visits. Some reports
from children indicated that follow-up visits from social workers attracted
attention to children in the community as being ‘different’. Their experience
was that community volunteers were able to move among families with more
ease. They also reported that reintegrated youth should play a greater role in
supporting new arrivals to the community.
Available evidence emerging with respect to the impact of centres on children’s
rehabilitation and reintegration in Northern Uganda, suggest that children who
spent time in centres have better mental health and psychosocial well being,
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compared to children that are returned directly to communities.48 Former
abductees interviewed told us of the distress they experienced after they had
escaped. Many had nightmares, were disturbed, felt anxious and afraid, and were
not settled in their minds. One youth said he found the counselling helped, in
particular to reduce the nightmares. Another said, “World Vision cared for me
and gave me everything I needed. The most positive thing was it helped me how
to live in the community. I don’t incite other people, I am obedient to my parents,
I don’t mix with other bad boys, I live a good life. The counselling was good, they
taught us about child rights and that people should love one another.”
One counselling programme promotes the notion of collective forgiveness,
and this was a theme in some youth’s accounts of their own coping strategies.
For example, one youth, asked if he feels angry if someone refers to him as a
rebel responded, “No, because they have been counselling me to forgive, to
forget about the past, think about what we are doing today”.
From the accounts of staff and former abductees, it seems that trauma symp-
toms such as nightmares only become pronounced once abductees return to
the community, and over time, due to counselling or traditional ceremonies,
the dreams lessen. There is a recognition in the community that children who
have been through the psychosocial programmes are less ‘rude’, have more
respect for people and elders (except if they are provoked), are less disturbed
in their minds, and that in the centre, their character is changed so they can
fit into community, unlike those who did not go to a centre.
One of the boys who had never been through a centre felt that it was easier
for former adbuctees to readjust if they had been to a centre. He indicated
that they had been cared for, given things such as resettlement kits and
received education. For youth who had been through the centres, the one
thing they most appreciated was education and skills training, since this facil-
itated their transition into the labour market.
Return to the Community: a changed environment
If you are under 20 and living here, you have known virtually nothing
else in your whole life but what it is like to live in a community endur-
ing armed conflict-conflict in which you are a prime target.49
Community reintegration implies a removal from a community of origin and
then a physical and psychological reinsertion back into that social and 
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psychological space. Continuously, in the process of the fieldwork, the ques-
tion that kept re-emerging for the formerly abducted youth, the community,
and for us as researchers was ‘reintegration into what’? There is no commu-
nity, in terms of what was. In addition to the abductions of thousands of chil-
dren and the deaths of children and adults, sixteen years of conflict has result-
ed in the destruction of homes and villages, forced the overwhelming major-
ity into IDPs or other forms of displacements and destroyed essential servic-
es, such as health units and schools. In essence, the conflict has broken down
the very fabric of Acholi society.
People are living in constant fear, which has undermined traditional customs
around which the rural Acholis built their value, ethical and normative base
and are no longer followed. Safe protective family environments within which
family’s function and children should be developing no longer exist. In addi-
tion to the forced witnessing and participation in atrocities against their own
communities the repeated insecurity in the region has led to wanton destruc-
tion of property and social infrastructure, such as schools, community centres,
churches, markets, and homes. This in turn undermines the economic base
upon which Acholi society has functioned on. All the major sources of income
in the region have crumbled due to the destruction and looting. The cattle
population in the district of Arua and Kitgum in 1985 were about 285,000,
but by 1997 the combined herd for both districts was estimated at just 5,000
head. The total number of cattle is less than 10% of the pre-insurgency herd
size, and there has been almost 100% loss in four years.
The insecurity has had many effects on family structures, frequently resulting
in family separation. From time to time, when the rebels are raiding, people
are frequently displaced or dislocated temporarily. During such times, families
live on the run, many of them sleeping in the bush, with no time for cultiva-
tion or normal life. These hidden sleeping places in the bush are referred to
as ‘aloofs’. Some displaced people have migrated to towns and stay there;
others oscillate between the towns and their homesteads. The usual, non-dis-
placement size of Gulu municipality was about 38,000 people. During peri-
ods of insecurity, between 12 to 16,000 people mainly women and children,
commute to and from Gulu town, between 5:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. daily.
These shifts have also affected parental care, since parents do not sleep with
their children. Family members disperse and are frequently left to fend for
themselves.
One outcome of the conflict has been the establishment of large IDP camps,
which has led to overcrowding and the breaking down of important cultural
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traditions. Some of the IDP camps are quite substantial in size, for example,
Pabbo camp in Gulu had up to 33,000 residents, while Pajule camp in Kitgum
had 24,000. Such numbers are particularly significant when one considers
that, culturally; individuals are accustomed to residing in dispersed rural
homesteads or small villages of 100 households or less. Furthermore, none of
these new settings are based on clanships and family structures, thus the alien-
ation from traditional cultures is further increased. Few families regard their
migration into urban centres as permanent and do not construct sturdy hous-
es or good sanitation. Yet the reality is many have been living in such condi-
tions for several years. The conditions for children and youth in these condi-
tions are grim. The majority of youth do not attend school. Traditional liveli-
hoods of land cultivation are not possible, and employment prospects for
youth mainly consist of marginal labour such as charcoal burning, street vend-
ing, smuggling, vehicle washing, wheelbarrow pushing and boda-boda. Rape
and ‘defilement’ of girls is commonplace, and there is increased domestic vio-
lence, child abuse and sexual and gender-based violence.50
Within the IDP camps, but also in towns, many people with different cultur-
al backgrounds and different values are being mixed together leading to dis-
ruption of cultural norms. An immediate implication of this is that children
and youth are neither versed in the traditions of their society and in many
instances, lack the support and adequate care of both their parents and
extended family. It is in the context of this already highly disrupted socialisa-
tion environment, which offers extremely limited opportunities for young
people, that children and youth must negotiate their resettlement and reinte-
gration.
Community responses: reintegration and reconciliation –
cultural tools in violence resistance
In Nordstrom’s writing about post-conflict community relations in
Mozambique, she puts forward a cultural definition of violence as “the
destruction of home and humanity, of hope and future, of valued traditions
and the integrity of the community” as violence insinuated itself into society
and culture.51 It is in this changed and changing social landscape that reinte-
gration occurs. What this implies is that there is no simple ‘going back,’
because the identity of the returnee and the community to each other, has
been charged and is still changing through violence. Yet, in Uganda, as in
many conflict zones, the individual is also of the community. The desire of the
community and the individual in many cases is for reclamation.
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Nordstrom’s powerful observation from Mozambique is that reintegration has
to be understood as a process that is situated in this culture of violence, but
that, in reintegration, there is an opportunity for resisting the generative qual-
ities of violence through creative reintegration resolution strategies. In
Northern Uganda, communities’ traditional means of survival have been mas-
sively impacted upon by the conflict, yet at the level of civil society, resistance
to the destructive impact of violence is expressed in the community push for
strategies for peace, a discourse of forgiveness, and local, community based
strategies to promote the reintegration of returnees from the rebel forces.
In travelling through Northern Uganda and from talking to people from com-
munity leaders, LCs, teachers, elders, business people, mothers and youth in
centres and in communities, there emerges a consistent sense of tiredness of
violence and a strong desire, at the level of civil society, for a peaceful resolu-
tion to the present conflict. This has been systematically commented upon in
virtually all reports that have emerged from Northern Uganda since 1997,
which have strongly emphasised the existence of “a culture of peace” in
Acholiland.52 Even in our interviews, a desire for peace and the concept of
forgiveness emerged again and again. The response of the abducted teacher
in our sample was not untypical. When asked how he would feel if he met
the rebels again, he responded:
Teacher: I have no grudge. I don’t feel anything because I know, I under-
stand we are in the same boat so I can definitely forgive.
Interviewer: So if you see the rebels, you won’t feel angry?
Teacher: I can’t simply just forgive...as I’ve passed all these stages, I sim-
ply know how to bear the hardship, so I can forgive.
The sense is people have already experienced too much hardship, almost
more than they can bear. It is estimated that over 90% of people are current-
ly displaced in Gulu and Kitgum, and there exists approximately 30 protect-
ed villages.53
Within civil society, the issue of reintegration of former abductees has been
linked with issues of reconciliation and forgiveness. Influential groups such as
the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative and the Concerned Parent’s
Association have articulated this as a necessary part of a movement towards
peace. Rather than being a top down process taken by religious leaders,
mobilising reintegration and reconciliation seems to stem from individuals and
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communities themselves. Its roots lie in a Christian doctrine of forgiveness, in
traditional Acholi cultural beliefs around spirituality, cleansing and social heal-
ing and in a political will to move beyond the personal and cultural destruc-
tion caused by conflict.
The reintegration process will also force abductees and community members
to face their deeply painful personal histories. Pain reports an LRA spokesman
saying, “The Acholi must be given the chance to amend the wounds among
themselves. This must be done traditionally by the community.”54 From the
position of civil society, a report by the Women’s Commission notes, “in gen-
eral, communities are willing to offer forgiveness and support the amnesty for
LRA. Adults try to remember that the young people abducted by the LRA are
not there by choice but on the threat of death.”55
How do communities reconcile the positions held by the individual returnee?
Pain discusses early peace talks in 1994, in which an LRA commander
acknowledged the “cutting of lips, hands and deforming people” as revenge
by fighters who felt isolated and disowned in the bush. He noted “It is the
commission of these ‘personal’ offences and the guilt associated with them
which is at the heart of the continuing conflict in Acholi. No resolution which
will hold can avoid addressing these offences.”56 He reports on a meeting of
the Rwodi-mo in which the discussion articulated how internally damaging
the current war is, and their belief “there is no precedence in the history of
Acholi for the current situation.” It was mentioned what “the rebels are doing
is so strange – it is never known in Acholi experience.”57 On this basis, he con-
cluded that the assumption is that all clans and sub-clans are both victims and
perpetrators, thus acknowledging it is not just individual returnees that have
to be reintegrated with the community, but relations between families, sub-
clans and clans are integrally tied up in the reintegration and reconciliation
process. This sets out the highly complex task that communities are attempt-
ing when engaging in reintegration.
A core factor in meaningful reintegration is in trying to understand what the
meaning of children and youth’s involvement in the LRA, the impact this may
have had on the children, and as a result, what measures are needed in order
to reclaim their children, has for the community. According to one account,
in 1986 when Museveni seized power and Acholi soldiers returned to their
homelands, the community perceived the returnees as “internal strangers”.58
The notion captures the sense that these returnees were of the community,
but had become alien to those who had remained at home. They were not
trusted, because it was believed by the community that they were carrying
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bad cen or evil spirits. Behrand argues that the Holy Spirit Movement in part,
evolved as a result of a failed reintegration process of these ex-soldiers. The
HSM served to reintegrate and rehabilitate a large number of these soldiers
and offered them purification and redemption through the spiritual rituals and
military actions of the HSM.
As illustrated in the above analysis, for formerly abducted children, there is a
risk that their communities of origin could perceive the returning youth as
‘internal strangers.’ While families are joyous that their children have survived,
they are filled with apprehension because their children’s experiences in the
bush have been so opposed and cut off from them and their community. A
former abductee recollects his homecoming as follows:
The reception was so good for me because they had no hope that I
was alive. They welcomed me but us seemed they had some fears I
had done atrocities so they kept asking all these questions. I was not
forced to kill anybody so I told them everything that had happened…I
didn’t like it because they wanted to know in detail all that had hap-
pened and I was not free about it. It made me sad.
Another explained:
(My family) were happy when I reached home, they were very happy
to see me, they said ‘Welcome back, you have been in the bush’. In
the village, they treat me like a brother. But some people do not like
seeing you. They call me rebel.
A community leader explained the dilemma facing parents as follows:
You have to understand the fear factor that people live with. The fear
is so high. First, when children are abducted and taken into captivity,
what they are forced to do is terrible. They are forced to kill, they are
trained to shoot, so mentally they get problems. So as a result of the
mental affects, you find when children come back home, parents are
afraid to interact with these children for their own safety. Parents find
it difficult to control such kid’s behaviour.
In spite of the difficulties and conflicts raised by returnee youth, in interviews
with youth, parents, teachers and groups of ordinary men and women, there
seemed to be a consistent sense of a constructive and dynamic approach to
the task of reintegration. It appears to be underpinned by the responsibility of
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the clan and community to actively reclaim their children and youth.
According to the Acholi belief systems, the dreams and nightmares children
experience were bad cen or spirits that disturb the child and these should be
dealt with accordingly. One youth told the following story, which captures a
sense of how cen or bad spirits work.
I saw a boy who was forced to kill his sister-in-law. He tried to plead
with these people- said this is my sister-in-law, I know this lady, but
the commanders told him to kill the sister in law or if he didn’t, he
would be killed. So he killed the sister-in-law. So when he came back
and was reintegrated in the community, he started having nightmares
like the lady was speaking in his mind; ‘You have killed me for no rea-
son, I even knew you’; that was what happened.
Communities have a number of rituals, which can rid the child of the cen and
restore peace to him or her. These ceremonies are intertwined with the lan-
guage of forgiveness, healing and restoration. One specific ritual, referred to
locally as ‘the breaking of eggs, ‘communities and youth frequently referred to
is utilised to acknowledge children’s physical and spiritual absence, return and
cleansing. In this ceremony, the child walks on a path and is required to step
on and break some eggs. Towards the end of the ceremony, the child walks
through the door of the house, at which point water is poured over his or her
head. By the time the child has completed the ritual process, the broken eggs
are left behind and the child emerges as cleansed. One youth who had such
a ceremony performed for him described it as “You step on the eggs to make
you a member of the family”.
Another ritual performed to rid a person of bad cen or spirits, is called yubo
kom (‘cleansing the body) and involves working with an adjoc or local healer.
When a child has killed another person, that person’s spirit comes back to
haunt him or her. The adjoc facilitates the transference of the bad cen from
the child to the adjoc. Once the cen has entered the adjoc’s body he comes
to understand what has happened, and the reason for the disturbance, and
communicates this experience with the individual. After that the spirit may be
placed in a goat and then the goat is killed, thus effectively killing the spirit
and restoring peace Given the cost of a goat, yubo kom involves the whole
clan, both in organising the ceremony and taking responsibility for it. This also
gives the child a sense of being valued by the collective family. The ritual
killing of the goat or ram is traditionally “accompanied by an abila presenta-
tion to ask the ancestors to forgive and protect the child or person. Without
this cleansing process, it is feared that the victim’s spirit will continue to haunt
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the person, leading to delinquent behaviour and possibly even a tendency to
kill again”.59
Community members also referred to mato oput, a reconciliation ceremony
performed when conflict exists between two families. This ceremony involves
bringing the families of a victim and accused together. Elders are required to
investigate the conflict. During the performance of the ceremony there is a
clan or group acceptance of responsibility for wrongdoing, repentance, com-
pensation, and finally reconciliation. This is marked by both sides drinking a
bitter root extract, which restores relationships between the two sides.60
The concept integral to these rituals is that bad cen enters a person as a result
of evil or bad deeds. Through performing specific rituals the bad cen can be
cast out by acknowledging, the community witnessing, accepting and forgiv-
ing. In this way the acts of violence or ‘badness’ become external to the child
and thus the child can be reclaimed. They serve as a cultural strategy to deal
with the internal/external conflict outlined earlier, of abducted children both
as victims and perpetrators of violence. These cultural rituals and beliefs
acknowledge how internally damaging the impact of violence has been on
both individuals and their communities, and work towards restoring personal
and collective peace.
At a social and cultural level, discourses of forgiveness promoted by the
Religious leaders, the Concerned Parents Association and psychosocial pro-
grammes are supportive and not in conflict with these cultural beliefs. Acholi
cultural beliefs are essentially strongly anti-violence.61 As such, these beliefs
and rituals, when used in reintegration, can be viewed as violence-resistance
in a culture now being simultaneously constituted and destroyed by violence.
Yet one wonders whether these rituals represent traditional belief systems,
given that they were also appropriated by Alice’s Holy Spirit Movement and
later Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. It is difficult to get a sense of how former
abductees relate to them and in our interviews, the attitudes expressed by
youth with respect to traditional ceremonies was not consistent. Some viewed
them as important in having helped them reintegrate, while others dismissed
them with a shrug as not offering anything of relevance to them.
In a survey of 183 returnee respondents, about 50% performed traditional
ceremonies in reintegration.62 The study examined the fears of returnees,
which bring home the fact that returnees are not being reintegrated to a post-
conflict situation, but to a society still caught up in and experiencing ongoing
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violence. Of their sample, 40% feared re-abduction; 21% feared they would
be killed by the LRA – with those who stayed in the bush for longer the fear
of being killed was greater; 11% feared the general insecurity. A further 4%
worried about the trouble of starting a new life in the community; (4%) were
concerned that the Government was not being serious about the amnesty;
and (4%) worried about disease and poverty. Only 12% had no fears, of whom
three quarters were with the LRA for one year or less.63
These fears were evident in our interviews and the impact of these on fami-
lies often caused further dislocation. Once a child of the family returned
home, it brought fear to the whole family that the LRA would come to the
house of the family to re-abduct the child or punish the whole family by mur-
dering the parents. This had been the experience of one of our respondents,
who was orphaned by the LRA after his return home. Some parents reported
they moved to ‘protected settlements’ after their child returned, because they
feared they would be killed, or their child re-abducted. One camp leader
explained the dilemma facing families and youth on reintegration as follows:
The problem in the Acholi region is that when the children have been
abducted, then again when the children have been returned, and
passed through reintegration, and reintegrated into communities,
they can come back and re-abduct them again. That is the major
problem.
Although some youth said they dealt with the past by ‘forgetting’ and not talk-
ing about it, the ongoing insecurity continues to make psychological recovery
difficult. One youth explained:
I continued to have dreams, nightmares, sometimes I’m very sad. It
still comes, most of the dreams I dream, I am still in the bush...dreams
of moving with the rebels, beating people, all those activities I used
do. When I first came out, I dreamed nightly, almost all of the time. I
feel anxious now that the rebels will come.
Furthermore, and not surprisingly, in spite of the culture of peace and discourses
of forgiveness and reconciliation, there are real tensions around reintegration and
reconciliation at a community level. Teachers described some of the tensions that
sometimes emerged in schools, where other children would refer to returnees as
‘rebels’, and their strategies to deal with this. One young woman explained, “If
there is a misunderstanding, they would say, ‘you have been in the bush, that is
how your character is.’ Even in the village, they sometimes say that”.
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Teachers and community leaders noted that returned youth tended to be
more aggressive than those that had not been abducted – one explained it
as “those children are bitter.” This bitterness was linked to what he per-
ceived in some youth as their difficulty in forgiving their family and com-
munity for allowing them to be abducted, for somehow failing to protect
them adequately. This dimension to the concept of ‘forgiveness’ shows how
complex the dynamics between those abducted and other community
members are.
In general, Rodriguez et al., found that longer periods spent in the bush
were associated with former abductees experiencing more problems on
reintegration. They found that the extent to which a returnee was welcomed
was linked to gender and duration in the LRA. According to this study, 70%
of females claimed that they felt welcomed on their return, compared to
57% of the males. In addition, they found “Exactly half of those who report-
ed feeling welcomed had been inducted for four months or less, and only
5% were inducted for four or more years”. In total, 64% felt welcomed on
their return, 22% initially felt welcomed, but later had bad experiences and
14% had some problems, but also some positive experiences. They found
only 8% of those inducted less than five months reported bad experiences,
whereas induction of six years or more represented 63% of the bad experi-
ences, such as abusive language, being avoided or isolated, or feeling intim-
idated or threatened. “The final negative experience that returnees report-
ed from the community is jealousy from those who are still missing family
members and struggle openly with accepting those that have returned”.
Interestingly, with respect to our observations based on group discussions
with community members, they concluded, “There is clearly a difference
between how the community perceived how they are welcoming returnees
and how returnees feel they are being welcomed…it is also hard to find
examples of forgiveness”.64
In spite of this conclusion, our interviews (in at least some if not most cases of
youth we talked to) did indicate that reintegration was reasonably successful,
in the sense of restoring social relations, in the immediate to short terms. One
of the factors, which really promotes acceptance of former abductees, is the
ongoing and constant awareness that “it can happen to any of us” and the col-
lective meaning of the experience of abduction described earlier – that it is
within everyone’s imagination and understanding. The collective impact of
multiple abductions in villages also gives people a common point of reference
and understanding, and some children mentioned how this impacted on their
acceptance and reintegration.
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Interviewer: How did other people react?
Youth: They accepted me. They didn’t disturb me. People said
‘Welcome back, we thank God for you’. They were not asking
many questions. I told (friends) not to go to the water. By telling
them, they should know keep themselves safe, not to be
attacked
Interviewer: Did people ever call you names?
Youth: No, in my village, 9 children were abducted and three came
back. The others remained in the bush or maybe they are dead.
Interviewer: Have you met any of the six families?
Youth: Yes, I have met them. They live very close. It was so difficult
because one of the 6, he was the one who helped me in the
bush when I was sick”.
Youth (2): “I told them whatever they asked but I was scared to talk of
everything that happened.
Although based on a small sample, the shared insights of youth into their
experiences of abduction and reintegration indicate how complex an experi-
ence it is for individuals and their communities.
Overall, it seemed that factors that contributed to successful reintegration
were participation in the psychosocial programmes (in general, as it is difficult
to be clear what element of programme activities contributed most to reinte-
gration), the opportunity to return to education, skills training and support to
become economically active or independent. The loss experienced by
returnees as a result of their abduction is not just about the impact of their
experiences, but also about lost opportunities and, as one youth expressed it,
a loss of a future. When asked what of his experiences makes him most sad,
the formerly abducted teacher replied, “The stage I am now in. I would have
developed into something (in the community, in his work), now I have no
chance.” One of the most valued components of the psychosocial interven-
tions was the skills training, for it restored some of this sense of a future with
opportunity.
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This paper has documented how children and youth are at the epicentre of
the conflict involving the Lords Resistance Army, the Ugandan government
and the Acholi civilian population. As a result of abduction and forced partic-
ipation in war and atrocities, children are the direct victims of the conflict.
Their abduction tears at the hearts of parents, families and society as a whole,
while the fear of possible abduction remains a constant threat to all. The
defilement and rape of abducted girls serves as violation of families and the
entire community, a transgression or act of pollution that distances abducted
girls from their community of origin. Simultaneously, while adult fighters are
thought to comprise a small core of the LRA, the bulk of the LRA is comprised
of these abducted youth who are forced to perpetuate atrocities on their own
communities.65 The implications of these dynamics form one of the central
cruxes of this complex conflict.
By late 2002, the Acholi have not only experienced the breakdown of their
agricultural and economic base, but have also been systematically stripped of
their cultural and traditional values. Furthermore, as a direct result of the LRA
created instability and the Government’s response through the creation of
“protected settlements”, the majority of the Acholi population are now inter-
nally displaced and also politically disenfranchised.
This issue of the centrality of children’s experiences to the conflict in northern
Uganda raises a very uncomfortable question-what is the function of chil-
dren’s stories in this conflict? More fundamentally, are the experiences and
horrors perpetuated against children being manipulated-wittingly or unwit-
tingly-by vested interests in this conflict?
As outlined above, the roots of this conflict lie in political disenfranchisement
and the cultural breakdown of the Acholi people. The traditional agricultural
economic base has been systematically undermined as a result of the LRA 
created instability and the Government’s response through the creation of 
protected settlements, so that now 90% of the Acholi population are internally
displaced. Yet the plight of children as abductees has become the local and
CHAPTER 4
A POLITICO- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
international symbol of the horrors of this conflict. In reading different accounts
of the violence experienced by children, they take on a mind-numbing similar-
ity. To a large extent, economic and political discourse has been put to one side
as human rights and child protection voices dominate. The brutalisation of chil-
dren by the LRA places the organisation beyond the moral pale. This sense of
the LRA as a movement operating beyond the bounds of rationality is further
supported by its spirit beliefs, its strange behavioural impositions on the 
population, and its recent branding as a ‘terrorist’ organisation, which has paved
the way for the Government’s response, ‘Operation Iron Fist’. Arguably, the
focus on ‘children’ as a symbol of this conflict serves to act as a smokescreen
which deflects pressure from addressing the underlying political and economic
roots of this conflict, the factors maintaining conflict such as the protected 
settlements, and the needs of special interest groups which profit from the war’s
continuance.
It has been suggested that the LRA are not interested in peace, political sta-
bility or the reconstruction of a shattered country. In spite of the existence of
a political amnesty, it is quietly recognised that amnesty is unlikely to apply to
the LRA leadership thus offering little real incentive to key LRA members for
disarmament and disbandment. However it is possible that the amnesty
would not be an incentive in itself to a group that matches more profile of
warlordism than that of a political rebel group, as it continues to benefit from
the pillage and destruction of Acholi society for its own continuity. However
at a government and military level, this has frequently resulted in a lack of dis-
tinction between the rebels and Acholi society, which is evident in the con-
tinued political, social and economic marginality of the region while the rest
of Uganda has developed and prospered. It has also been evident in the lack
of political development or integration of other Acholi groups that could act
as a political forum for the Acholi people. Further, it has often been alluded
that “no rebel force could exist in that area if the civilians did not want them
there”.66 The Ugandan government has sometimes referred to the northern
Uganda conflict as “Acholi killing themselves”, implying that the government
has lacked serious motivation to engage in finding a solution to the conflict,
and as a result, to the development of the Acholi region.67
Cyclically, the Ugandan government has sought a military solution to the cri-
sis, which does not seem to be reaching any successful ending. The war with
the LRA would appear to have reached a new stage and the UPDF has admit-
ted that during military combat, its forces were unable to protect civilians in
southern Sudan. Currently, there are no signs of LRA-abducted children
emerging, even as prisoners of war, with Ugandan troops, instead, the UDPF
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has conceded that children were being killed rather than rescued. In response
to international criticism, instead of committing to minimising child casualties,
a UPDF spokesman emphasised that the children had been militarised, indoc-
trinated and trained to resist. Instead of promoting movement to peace, it has
deepened the destruction of Acholi society by forcing even more of the 
resident population in Gulu into IDP camps, where they have still not been
safe from LRA attacks. Furthermore, it is claimed that UPDF soldiers have 
subjected them to arbitrary arrests, torture including rape, and other abuses.
There would seem to be no end to this and as late as October 2002, with the
renewed LRA offensive, the UPDF continued to order civilians in Acholi 
districts to leave their homes and move closer to these IDP camps. One argu-
ment put forward is that the conflict enables the UPDF to continue securing
ongoing high levels of military funding.68 However, given Uganda’s recent
involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the fact that Museveni
himself came from the military, it is unlikely that this conflict would make
much difference to military budget. One hypothesis is that locally based
Government military units may have vested power and economic interests in
the continuance of the conflict and there is anecdotal evidence that the local
military has scuppered locally based peace initiatives by the Acholi Religious
Leaders Peace initiative, thus dragging out and prolonging the conflict.69
The third group that would seek to benefit from an extended conflict of this
nature are the business warlords who use the chaos both for illegal activities,
money laundering, raw material exploitation, ammunitions trading and
human trafficking. Once again, the economy of the area lacks the sophisti-
cated mechanisms necessary for money laundering and there are no known
mining or wildlife reserves, as in Sierra Leone. The gun trade is almost insignif-
icant for there is a sufficient pool of weapons in the region that would totally
undermine any commercialisation of the trade, and as such there is no evi-
dence of human trafficking. This group may be profiting from the ongoing
conflict but are unlikely to have major influence over any political outcome.
This research did not seek to investigate these issues and they are raised in the
context of understanding the function of children’s stories and experiences
within the overall context of the conflict. The tendency of child-oriented pro-
gramming is to depoliticise the position of children and call for a focus on
child rights and welfare. However our conclusion is that, in this conflict,
where abducted children are central to the dynamics of the conflict, it is use-
ful to examine the political place of children in the discourse. Our conclusion
is that the focus on the death, torture and brutality experienced by children
has allowed a vacuum to emerge in which issues of political, regional, and
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social development have been allowed to be sidestepped and the political
development of groups that could be central to the peace process and the
development of Acholi society ignored. A lack of differentiation between
Acholi society and the LRA has justified a military campaign, which has turned
the entire region into a large displacement camp that is economically, cultur-
ally and politically bereft. What is true is that Acholi society has been
destroyed and that today Acholis in Gulu can be said to comprise a socially
bankrupt, economically under-developed and politically alienated grouping
of internally displaced peoples. The answer to one of the questions raised at
the beginning of the research was “reintegration into what?” This is addressed
in the concluding chapter.
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Examining what is meant by reintegration necessitates clarification on two
fronts. The first is the practical reality of trying to define the type of family,
community and environment into which children are being re-integrated. 
It has been argued that prolonged warfare has meant that in many cases 
children have been born, raised and abducted from war effected areas where
the vestiges of ‘normal’ society ceased to exist a long time ago. Reintegration
occurs in the context of family relationships that are conducted under a state
of social uncertainty within a political state of emergency. Furthermore none
of the services and infrastructure, no matter how rudimentary these may be,
could be considered as functional. Schools have ceased to function in many
areas, water supplies are constantly disrupted and transport networks are con-
tingent on the security situation and thus unreliable. The economies have
been shattered and linkages to the greater region highly disrupted, if not com-
pletely severed. Even in soil-rich northern Uganda subsistence agriculture has
come under pressure as people have been squeezed into ever decreasing spa-
tial entities as a result of voluntary or forced relocation to IDP camps or towns.
Where remnants of ‘normality’ exist, they operate under conditions of
extreme stress. Ex-abducted children and youth are being re-united into envi-
ronments that are fundamentally different to those they may have left behind.
Current reintegration strategies are largely aimed at reunification into a fami-
ly and community putting their energies into dealing with trauma and for-
giveness. What is not adequately addressed is the question of whether ex-
abductees are simply expected to resume their lives from that point at which
they were abducted or whether the returnee is a changed person unable (or
unwilling) to slot into a pre-determined role. An element of reintegration pro-
grammes that addresses these economic, and therefore social reintegration, is
that of skills-training and income generation. Sadly, these elements of one
project’s reintegration programme are under threat of being discontinued for
funding reasons.
A second ground for examining reintegration concerns local meanings of what
‘reintegration’ means. In northern Uganda, concepts of reconciliation and 
forgiveness are placed central to reintegration, promoted not only by the 
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psychosocial programmes, but also by religious leaders and other communi-
ty-based organisations, among which the Concerned Parent’s Association are
prominent. Reconciliation and forgiveness support are not in conflict with tra-
ditional cultural beliefs nor can they be dismissed because traditional society
has broken down. Reconciliation and forgiveness forces abductees and their
families, as well as other families who have suffered losses of children and
other community members to face their deeply painful personal histories and
initiate a healing process. It recognises many of the psychosocial traumas that
the ex-abductees have suffered are not theirs alone, but have been shared by
their fellow community members also. A core factor in meaningful reintegra-
tion is trying to understand what this means to each of the stakeholders. While
families are joyous that their children have survived, they are filled with
apprehension because their children’s experiences in the bush have been so
opposed and cut off from them and their community and they fear continu-
ing dislocation and what impact that this may have on the remaining mem-
bers of the family.
Furthermore, and not surprisingly, in spite of the culture of peace and dis-
courses of forgiveness and reconciliation, there are real tensions around rein-
tegration and reconciliation in a locality to which ex-abductees return.
Experiences within the LRA may have fundamentally altered the manner in
which ex-abductees function as members within a family or constituents with-
in a community and are possibly changed forever. Community members have
concerns that this may be negative, and that ex-abductees may be aggressive
or violent as a result of the violence they themselves were exposed to.
However, teachers and community’s leaders noted another side of this, that
some of these children who returned were stronger and more confident than
children who were never abducted and their experiences in the bush coupled
to the success of escaping gave them a newfound confidence and leadership
qualities. This offers both opportunities and threats for Acholi society. This
newfound confidence that may find expression in both civic and political mat-
ters, could potentially bring ex-abductees into conflict with the rest of their
society. Alternatively, this confidence would be harnessed in a political forum
of peace-building and social development. Although little empirical evidence
exists to suggest which outcome is more likely, it highlights the complex role
of reintegration in being the seeds of future conflict-or in contributing to
future peace.
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